Perceptions and Possibility in A Midsummer Night's Dream
"To leave the figure or disfigure it"
A Midsummer Night's Dream uses early modern notions of vision to alter and confound the ways playgoers see the play. The initial conflict arises from Hermia's insistence that she cannot possibly "choose love by another's eyes" (1.1.140). Like many of the characters in A Midsummer Night's Dream, she insists that her own visual perceptions are trustworthy and immutable. In this play, the frequent mention of the word "eyes," the importance of the visual tricks, and the characters' misperceptions of other characters' actions belong to a world made of different ways of seeing.
1 I shall take up sight in the play specifically as it relates to the ways early modern playgoers understood vision to function and then explore how characters see: see events, see themselves, see other characters, and "see" in the more abstracted sense of understand. This exploration opens the possibility of examining afresh what playgoers see when watching the play; it also offers an answer to the question, how do these framings of characters' sensory experiences alter or even produce playgoers' understanding of the play? Obviously, not all playgoers react in the same fashion, experience the play similarly from their respective vantage points, or necessarily visually comprehend the play in the terms that I set out here. However, this reading outlines a system of visual markers that exists within the narrative organization of the play and that intrinsically connects to early modern notions of sight.
In the early modern era, multiple concurrent and irreconcilable descriptions of vision offered explanations for sight and attempted to bolster belief in the certainty of vision. Pre-Keplerian notions of vision depend heavily on the idea of objects being visible through representational impressions on the eye, hence the common descriptions of representational figuring, marking, stamping, or impressing on the mind or memory. In Richard Banister's Breviary of the Eye (1622), he explains initially that 'seeing beames come from the Eye."
2 Banister goes on to explain how those beams function: "Three things are required for sight: That the beames associate the Ayre. That seeing spirits slide not out. That the visible spirits be united with the Ayre. A certaine alteration, and not a substance is cast into the Eye." 3 A wide variety of descriptions of the mechanics of that impressing and the role of imagination in perception complicates matters.
Andreas du Laurens (translated into English by Richard Suphlet in 1599) explains that the philosophers agree on the parts of the eye and the necessary elements for vision to occur. But once the philosophers go on to "shew the maner of this action [...] they jarre among themselves and cannot agree."
4 Laurens describes the two general approaches:
Some of them would have that there should issue out of the eye bright beames or a certaine light which should reach unto the object, and thereby cause us to see it: other some would have it, that the object commeth unto the eye, and that nothing goeth out of the eye: the first doe hold that we see by emission or having something going forth of the eye, the latter by reception or receiving of the object into the eye.
5
Both of these versions of seeing, "emission" and "reception" in Laurens" terms, theorize that vision depends on some type of representational impression. 6 Stuart Clark argues that the "representational model of vision" collapsed between the early fifteenth and the late seventeenth century "under the weight of the anomalies counting increasingly against it." 7 Clark points particularly to the increasing number of what he terms visual paradoxes: "situations where appearances that were supposed to be true proved difficult, perhaps impossible, to distinguish from appearances that were deemed to be false." 8 It was not only a matter of ghosts, spirits, or visionary seeings; new methods of measurement made ever more clear that the visual perception of distances could often be tricked simply by the circumstances of sight. The Renaissance "rediscovery" of linear perspective, as Samuel Edgerton describes it, allowed representational art to develop visual
